Summary. In this note two theorems strengthening Grodal's (1971) Theorem on correspondences are proved. The first drops the convexity assumption. The second strengthens that theorem further for the case when the range is the positive orthant. In this case, the conclusion of Grodal's Theorem -the intersection of the integral with the interior of the range being open -is modified to read as the integral being a relative open subset of the positive orthant. An example is provided to show that, such a strengthening is not valid in general. This allows us to dispense with the requirment of convexity of preferences in Grodal's (1971) theorems on the closedness of the set of Pareto optimal allocations, the core, and the continuity of the core correspondence for pure exchange economies. We apply this result to show that blocking coalitions in a large economy are stable.
Introduction
We start with some notation. Let Ω be the nonnegative orthant in R l . As usual, A A = (A \ A ) ∪ (A \ A) is the symmetric difference of two sets A and A . For a correspondence F : T → Ω, where (T, Σ, µ) is a measure space, and a µ−measurable set A ⊂ T we use short notations F (A) or A F for A F (t)dµ(t). Instead of T F we write F. In particular, for a µ−measurable function f : 
on T, ϕ(t) ⊂ X(t), ϕ(t) is open relative to X(t) and ϕdµ is convex. Then
A natural question relating to Theorem 0 is, whether under the assumptions of the theorem, ϕdµ is relative open in Xdµ? Clearly, a positive answer would strengthen Grodal's Theorem. Unfortunately, the answer is negative. We bring a due example. However, in the case of X(t) = Ω, a.e. on T, the above question has an affirmative answer (see Theorem 2 below). Furthermore, we show that the assumption of the convexity of ϕdµ is altogether superfluous (see Theorem 1 below).
Kannai (1970, Theorem B) has proven the continuity of the core of an atomless economy. Grodal (1971, Theorem 4) generalized this result to the case of economies including atoms (mixed economies). The assumptions made by Grodal are somewhat weaker and her proof is based on Theorem 0. She also showed that the set of Pareto optimal allocations is closed in the Banach space of all µ−integrable functions from T into R l , L 1 (T, σ, µ; R l ). An analysis of Grodal's proofs shows that the assumption of convexity of preferences is used to ensure the convexity of ϕ, where ϕ is an upper contour correspondence for a Pareto optimal or core allocation. This allows an application of Theorem 0. Therefore Theorem 1 makes Grodal's results on closedness of the set of Pareto optimal allocations, and the core, and continuity of the core of pure exchange economies (Grodal, 1971 , Theorems 3 and 4) valid even without the convexity requirement on preferences of agents.
Application in a different direction is related to the stability of blocking coalitions. In this note we show that if a coalition blocks an allocation, then any sufficiently small perturbation of that coalition will also block the allocation. In other words, an allocation that is blocked by a coalition will still be blocked by any coalition that slightly differs from the original one. The blocking ability of a coalition is thus robust with respect to small changes in the coalition. Since the unstability of blocking coalitions would reduce the practical relevance of the concept of the core and the precise formation of a particular coalition can hardly be expected in a large economy, such a stability result bears importance. For example, let us consider a large economy, an allocation f, and a coalition S, which is able to block f. Some of the agents who are outside S and are happy with allocation f could destroy coalition S, enticing a tiny group within S by transfer of part of their assignments to them. The robustness of blocking coalitions eliminates this undesirable possibility,
